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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-2472
____________
PATRICIA EVANS,
Appellant
vs.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA;
SUSAN TOBIN-SANTOMO; DAVID STANTON; DOLORES POSI
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-04975)
District Judge: Honorable John R. Padova
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 21, 2006
Before: FISHER, ALDISERT AND WEIS, CIRCUIT JUDGES
Filed March 27, 2006
____________
OPINION
____________
PER CURIAM.
In 2003, Appellant Patricia Evans, a former human resources employee of
the Federal Reserve Bank (FRB), sued the FRB and several of its employees alleging that
they engaged in retaliatory conduct prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss
the appeal.

I.
Evans claims that the FRB retaliated against her for lodging complaints
with supervising personnel that three African men she selected for possible employment
were denied positions because of this status. On February 4, 2005, a federal jury returned
a judgment against Evans. She filed a motion in the District Court for a new trial arguing
that the evidence was insufficient, the District Court improperly admitted multiple
hearsay statements, and the District Court improperly charged the jury on the retaliation
and causation elements of her claim. The Court denied the motion. Evans appealed pro
se, but failed to file a transcript or statement of issues on appeal. Meanwhile, she filed a
motion in the District Court for reconsideration of the order denying her motion for a new
trial raising several additional claims of error including juror incompetency and improper
use of a peremptory challenge. The District Court denied relief.1
II.
Evans’ notice of appeal challenges the verdict, but she has not expressly
appealed from the denial of her motion for a new trial or from her motion to reconsider.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(B)(ii). However, based on her filings on appeal, we infer that she
also intends to appeal from the District Court’s denial of her motion for a new trial. See
Benn v. First Jud. Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
documents outside the notice of appeal may inform the jurisdictional question).

1

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

The Appellees primarily argue that the appeal should be dismissed for
failure to request and file a trial transcript pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure 10(b) and 3(a)(2). Rule 10(b) requires an appellant to order a transcript of the
parts of the District Court proceedings that the appellant considers necessary. Fed. R.
App. P. 10(b)(1). When the Rule is not followed, we have recognized that Rule 3(a)(2)
permits “the court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, including dismissing the
appeal.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2); see Horner Equip. Intern., Inc. v. Seascape Pool Ctr.,
Inc., 884 F.2d 89, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1989). We will first examine whether any of the claims
can be assessed without a transcript.
We review the District Court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse
of discretion. See Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 430 (3d Cir. 2003). With respect to
Evans’ sufficiency argument we cannot assess whether the jury’s verdict was supported
by the evidence without the trial transcript. See LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 146
(3d Cir. 2003) (setting forth the standard of review). With respect to Evans’ hearsay
arguments, whether third-party statements are hearsay is a question of law, subject to
plenary review. See United States v. Sallins, 993 F.2d 344, 346 (3d Cir. 1993).
However, since Evans presents neither the precise challenged statements nor the
surrounding testimony, we cannot ascertain for what purpose the statements were made.
Similar hurdles are present in assessing Evans’ two jury charge arguments.
When examining the propriety of a jury charge, a court must look to the “charge as a
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whole in light of the evidence to determine if it fairly and adequately submitted the issues
to the jury . . . .” Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2001). In neither
instance does Evans argue that the District Court gave the jury an erroneous charge.
Instead, she states that the jury was prejudiced by the District Court’s repetition of the
causation charge and by the Court’s use of certain language in the retaliation charge. The
lack of a transcript prevents intelligent review of the instructions as they were actually
given.
With respect to her jury selection and competency claims, Evans argues
four separate issues: (1) the District Court failed to strike for cause a juror who used to
work for the FRB; (2) three female jurors were not fair and impartial because they were
talking and laughing throughout voir dire; (3) the jurors could not understand the District
Court’s instructions because one juror was asleep and another juror coughed; and (4) the
exclusion of an Asian male from the jury panel. Even assuming arguendo that the claims
are not waived, see 28 U.S.C. § 1867 (requiring timely objection to juror qualifications to
preserve issues under the Jury Section and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1878); United
States v. De Peri, 778 F.3d 963, 972 (3d Cir. 1985) (juror competency); Gov’t of Virgin
Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d 73, 74-76 (3d Cir. 1986) (Batson claim), to succeed on a juror
competency claim raised after the jury reached its verdict, Evans must make a “strong
showing that a juror was incompetent.” Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d 1073, 1078
(3d Cir. 1985). After a summary review, these claims also cannot be adequately
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examined without a transcript.
Evans first claims that one of the jurors was not impartial because he
previously worked for the FRB. Without establishing a greater evidentiary basis for her
position, merely identifying a relationship between a juror and the defendant is not
sufficient to establish partiality. See United States v. Calabrese, 942 F.2d 218, 224-25
(3d Cir. 1991). However, without a transcript, we are unable to examine the questions
posed to the juror or the nature of the relationship. We express similar concerns with
respect to claims (2) and (3). Evans alleges that several jurors were talking and laughing
during voir dire and appeared to be familiar with each other. She says nothing more and
we are unable to examine the transcript to determine whether any mention was made of
this exchange at all. This is equally true with respect to the charge that one juror slept
through nearly half of the Court’s instructions. Even if a transcript were produced, Evans
does not support her assertion with any evidence, and without more, she cannot establish
prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333, 335 (3d Cir. 1972).
Finally, it is impossible to review Evans’ race-based peremptory argument adequately
because to determine whether “a prima facie case has been established requires
consideration of all relevant circumstances . . . .” Edmond v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 631 (1991).
While dismissing an appeal for failure to satisfy Rule 10(b) is highly
disfavored, see Horner Equip., 884 F.2d at 93, in deciding whether dismissal of the appeal
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is appropriate, Horner Equipment instructs that we look to the factors outlined in Poulis v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). See Horner Equip., 884
F.2d at 93. We are to consider “whether the defaulting party’s action is willful or merely
inadvertent, whether a lesser sanction can bring about compliance and the degree of
prejudice the opposing party suffered because of the default.” Id.
Evans received numerous notices of her obligations and was given a
number of opportunities to satisfy Rule 10(b). For example, after the Appellees moved
for summary dismissal on these ground, we extended the briefing schedule and permitted
Evans to file any appendices, yet she again failed to comply. She has even been informed
of the ability to request transcripts in forma pauperis. At this point, it is hard to imagine
that Evans’ failure to satisfy the rule is completely inadvertent. Further, the degree of
prejudice that the Defendants have suffered by responding to her allegations weighs in
favor of dismissing the appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal for failure to file a
transcript on appeal.

